We address the problem of belief change in (nonmonotonic) logic programming under answer set semantics. Our formal techniques are analogous to those of distance-based belief revision in propositional logic. In particular, we build upon the model theory of logic programs furnished by SE interpretations, where an SE interpretation is a model of a logic program in the same way that a classical interpretation is a model of a propositional formula. Hence we extend techniques from the area of belief revision based on distance between models to belief change in logic programs.
INTRODUCTION
Answer set programming (ASP) [Baral 2003; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988 ] has emerged as a major area of research in knowledge representation and reasoning (KRR). On the one hand, ASP has an elegant and conceptually simple theoretical foundation, while on the other hand efficient implementations of ASP solvers exist which have been finding applications to practical problems. However, as is the case with any large program or body of knowledge, a logic program is not a static object in general, but rather it will evolve and be subject to change, whether as a result of correcting information in the program, adding to the information already present, coalescing information in several programs, or in some other fashion modifying the knowledge represented in the program.
Since knowledge is continually evolving and subject to change, there is a need to be able to modify logic programs as new information is received. In KRR, the area of belief revision [Alchourrón et al. 1985; Gärdenfors 1988 ] addresses just such change to a knowledge base. In AGM belief revision (named after the aforecited developers of the approach) one has a knowledge base K and a formula α, and the issue is how to consistently incorporate α in K to obtain a new knowledge base K . The interesting case is when K ∪ {α} is inconsistent, since beliefs have to be dropped from K before α can be consistently added. Hence, a fundamental issue concerns how such change should be managed.
In classical propositional logic, specific belief revision operators have been proposed based on the distance between models of a knowledge base and a formula for revision. That is, a characterization of the revision of a knowledge base K by formula α is to set the models of the revised knowledge base K to be the models of α that are "closest" to those of K. Of course the notion of "closest" needs to be pinned down, but natural definitions based on the Hamming distance [Dalal 1988 ] and set containment with regards to propositional letters [Satoh 1988 ] are well known.
In addition to belief revision (along with the dual notion of belief contraction), a second major class of belief change operators addresses the merging of knowledge bases. The problem of merging multiple, potentially conflicting bodies of information arises in various different contexts. For example, an agent may receive reports from differing sources of knowledge, or from sets of sensors that need to be reconciled. As well, an increasingly common phenomenon is that collections of data may need to be combined into a coherent whole. In these cases, the problem is that of combining knowledge sets that may be jointly inconsistent in order to obtain a consistent set of merged beliefs. Again, as in belief revision, specific operators for merging knowledge bases have been developed based on the distance between models of the underlying knowledge bases [Baral et al. 1992; Konieczny and Pino Pérez 2002; Liberatore and Schaerf 1998; Meyer 2001; Revesz 1993] .
It is natural then to consider belief change in the context of logic programs. Indeed, there has been substantial effort in developing approaches to so-called logic program updating under answer set semantics (as discussed in the next section). Unfortunately, given the nonmonotonic nature of answer set programs, the problem of change in logic programs appears to be intrinsically more difficult than in a monotonic setting. In this article, our goal is to reformulate belief change in logic programs in a manner analogous to belief change in classical propositional logic, and to investigate specific belief revision and merging operators for logic programs under the answer set semantics. Central to our approach are SE models [Turner 2003 ], which are semantic structures characterising strong equivalence between programs [Lifschitz et al. 2001 ]. This particular kind of equivalence plays a major role for different problems in logic programming-in particular, in program simplification and modularization. This is due to the fact that strong equivalence gives rise to a substitution principle in the sense that, for strongly equivalent programs P, Q, the programs P ∪ R and Q ∪ R have the same answer sets, for any program R. As is well known, ordinary equivalence between programs (which holds if two programs have the same answer sets) does not yield a substitution principle. Hence, strong equivalence can be seen as the logic programming analogue of ordinary equivalence in classical logic. The important aspect of strong equivalence is that it coincides with equivalence in a specific monotonic logic, the logic of here and there (HT), which is intermediate between intuitionistic logic and classical logic. Moreover, following Osorio and Zacarías [2004] and Osorio and Cuevas [2007] , strong equivalence amounts to knowledge equivalence of programs. That is, strong equivalence captures the logical content of a program. 1 As shown by Turner [2003] , equivalence between programs in HT corresponds in turn to equality between sets of SE models. Details on these concepts are given in the next section; the key point is that logic programs can be expressed in terms of a nonclassical but monotonic logic, and it is this point that we exploit here.
Given this monotonic characterization (via sets of SE models) of strong equivalence, we adapt techniques for belief change in propositional logic to belief change in logic programs. Hence we define specific operators for belief change in ASP analogous to operators in propositional logic. We first consider an expansion operator. In classical logic, the expansion of knowledge base K by formula α amounts to the deductive closure of K ∪ {α}. Hence it is not a very interesting operator, serving mainly as a tool for expressing concepts in belief revision and its dual, contraction. In logic programs however, expansion appears to be a more useful operator, perhaps due to the apparent "looser" notion of satisfiability provided by SE models. As well, it has appealing properties. We next develop revision operators based on notions of distance between SE models, and, following this, merging operators.
For a revision of logic program P by program Q, written P * Q, the resulting program is characterized by those SE models of Q that are closest to the SE models of P. We consider two notions of "closeness" between models; in both cases a notion of distance between models is defined in terms of the symmetric difference of the atoms true in each model. In one case, two models are of minimum distance if the symmetric difference is subset-minimal; in the other case they are of minimum distance if the symmetric difference is cardinality-minimal. These approaches to revision can be seen as extending the approaches of Satoh [1988] and Dalal [1988] , respectively.
In characterising the merging of logic programs, the central idea is that the SE models of the merged program are again those that are in some sense "closest" to the SE models of the programs to be merged. However, as with merging knowledge bases in classical logic, there is no single preferred notion of distance nor closeness, and consequently different approaches have been defined for combining sources of information. We introduce two merging operators for logic programs under answer set semantics. Both operators take an arbitrary (multi)set of logic programs as argument. The first operator can be regarded an instance of what Liberatore and Schaerf [1998] call arbitration. Basically (SE) models are selected from among the SE models of the programs to be merged; in a sense this operator is a natural extension of our belief revision operator. The second merging operator can be regarded as an instance of the one discussed by Konieczny and Pino Pérez [2002] . Here, models of a designated program (representing information analogous to database integrity constraints) are selected that are closest to (or perhaps, informally, represent the best compromise among) the models of the programs to be merged.
Notably, in our approaches there is effectively no mention of answer sets; rather definitions of expansion, revision, and merging are given entirely with respect to logic programs. Notably too, our operators are syntax independent, which is to say, they are independent of how a logic program is expressed. Hence (and in view of the intuitions of SE models as pointed out above), our operators deal with the logical content of a logic program.
Last, we show how our belief change approaches can be implemented. We do this by providing modular encodings for these operators in terms of a fixed nonground answer-set program. These encodings serve several purposes. First, they provide a proof-of-concept realization for the approaches. The encodings also help shed light on the details of the respective approaches. As well, they provide a tool for experimenting with the approaches.
Following an introductory background section, we show that there is a ready mapping between concepts in belief revision in classical logic and in ASP; this serves to place belief revision in ASP firmly in the "standard" belief revision camp. After this we describe in Section 3 our approaches to belief expansion and revision in ASP. We then employ these techniques in the following section to address the merging of logic programs. In each case, we discuss central properties and give complexity results. Then, in Section 5, we show how we can in fact express the process of belief change in ASP itself, giving a direct way to compute our introduced belief change operators, and we provide a general complexity analysis of our belief change approach. Finally, the article is concluded with a discussion. Proofs of results are contained in an appendix. Preliminary versions of the material in Sections 3 and 4 appeared in previous work Delgrande [2008 Delgrande [ , 2009 .
BACKGROUND AND FORMAL PRELIMINARIES

Answer Set Programming
Syntax and Semantics.
Let A be an alphabet, consisting of a set of atoms. A (generalized) logic program 2 (GLP) over A is a finite set of rules of the form a 1 ; . . . ; a m ; ∼b 1 ; . . . ; ∼b n ← c 1 , . . . , c o , ∼d 1 , . . . , ∼d p ,
where a i , b j , c k , d l ∈ A, and where m, n, o, p ≥ 0 and m + n + o + p > 0. Binary operators ';' and ',' express disjunctive and conjunctive connectives. A default literal is an atom a or its (default) negation ∼a. It is convenient to distinguish various types of rules. A rule r as in (1) is:
For example, p ← is a fact (some papers also express this as 'p.'); p ← q, ∼r is normal; p; q ← r, s is positive; p; q ← r, ∼s is disjunctive; and ← q, ∼r is an integrity constraint, sometimes also written ⊥ ← q, ∼r.
Accordingly, a program is called disjunctive (or a DLP) if it consists of disjunctive rules only. Likewise, a program is normal (resp., positive) iff all rules in it are normal (resp., positive). We furthermore define the head and body of a rule, H(r) and B(r), by:
Moreover, given a set X of literals, we define
For simplicity, we sometimes use a set-based notation, expressing a rule as in (1) as
In what follows, we restrict ourselves to a finite alphabet A. An interpretation is represented by the subset of atoms in A that are true in the interpretation. A (classical) model of a program P is an interpretation in which all of the rules in P are true according to the standard definition of truth in propositional logic, and where default negation is treated as classical negation. By Mod(P) we denote the set of all classical models of P. The reduct of a program P with respect to a set of atoms Y, denoted P Y , is the set of rules:
Note that the reduct consists of negation-free rules only. An answer set Y of a program P is a subset-minimal model of P Y . The set of all answer sets of a program P is denoted by AS(P). For example, the program P = {a ←, c; d ← a, ∼b} has answer sets AS(P) = {{a, c}, {a, d}}.
SE Models.
As defined by Turner [2003] , an SE interpretation is a pair (X, Y) of interpretations such that X ⊆ Y ⊆ A. An SE interpretation is an SE model of a program P if Y |= P and X |= P Y . The set of all SE models of a program P is denoted by SE (P) 
A program P is satisfiable just if SE(P) = ∅. Note that many authors in the literature define satisfiability in terms of answer sets, in that for them a program is satisfiable if it has an answer set, that is, AS(P) = ∅. Thus, for example, we consider P = {p ← ∼p} to be satisfiable, since SE(P) = ∅ even though AS(P) = ∅. 3 Two programs P and Q are strongly equivalent, symbolically P ≡ s Q, iff SE(P) = SE(Q). Alternatively, P ≡ s Q holds iff AS(P ∪ R) = AS(Q ∪ R), for every program R [Lifschitz et al. 2001] . We also write P |= s Q iff SE(P) ⊆ SE(Q). For simplicity, we often drop set-notation within SE interpretations and simply write, for instance, (a, ab) instead of ({a}, {a, b}) .
A feature of SE models is that they contain "more information" than answer sets, which makes them an appealing candidate for problems where programs are examined with respect to further extension (in fact, this is what strong equivalence is about). We illustrate this issue with the following well-known example, involving programs P = {p; q ←} and Q = p ← ∼← ∼p .
Here, we have AS(P) = AS(Q) = {{p}, {q}}. However, the SE models differ. For A = {p, q}, we have:
This is to be expected, since P and Q behave differently with respect to program extension (and thus are not strongly equivalent). Consider R = {p ← q, q ← p}. Then, AS(P ∪ R) = {{p, q}}, while AS(Q ∪ R) has no answer set. We next adopt concepts introduced by Eiter et al. [2005] which are instrumental for our purposes. Let us call a set S of SE interpretations well-defined if, for each
We have the following properties.
(1) For each GLP P, SE(P) is well-defined, and for each DLP P, SE(P) is complete.
(2) Conversely, for each well-defined set S of SE interpretations, there exists a GLP P such that SE(P) = S, and for each complete set S of SE interpretations, there exists a DLP P such that SE(P) = S.
Programs meeting the latter conditions can be constructed thus [Cabalar and Ferraris 2007; Eiter et al. 2005] : In case S is a well-defined set of SE interpretations over a (finite) alphabet A, define P by adding
In case S is complete, define P by adding (1) the rule r Y , for each (Y, Y) / ∈ S, as above, and (2) the rule r X,Y :
We call the resulting programs canonical.
For illustration, consider
Note that S is not complete. The canonical GLP is as follows:
q; ∼q ← ∼p; r ∅,pq : p; q; ∼p; ∼q ← .
For obtaining a complete set, we have to add (∅, pq) to S. Then, the canonical DLP is as follows:
We conclude this subsection by introducing definitions for ordering SE models that will be needed when we come to define our belief change operators. Let denote the symmetric difference operator between sets, that is, X Y = (X \ Y) ∪ (Y \ X) for every set X, Y. We extend so that it is defined for ordered pairs, as follows.
Similarly, we define a notion of set containment, suitable for ordered pairs, as follows.
As will be seen, these definitions are appropriate for SE interpretations, as they give preference to the second element of an SE interpretation.
Set cardinality is denoted as usual by | · |. We define a cardinality-based ordering over ordered pairs of sets as follows.
As with Definition 2.2, this definition gives preference to the second element of an ordered pair. It can be observed that the definition yields a total preorder over ordered pairs. In the next section we return to the suitability of this definition, once our revision operators have been presented.
Belief Change
Belief Revision.
The best known and, indeed, seminal work in belief revision is the AGM approach [Alchourrón et al. 1985; Gärdenfors 1988] , in which standards for belief revision and contraction functions are given. In the revision of a knowledge base K by a formula φ, the intent is that the resulting knowledge base contains φ, be consistent (unless φ is not), while keeping whatever information from K can be "reasonably" retained. Belief contraction is a dual notion, in which information is removed from a knowledge base. While belief contraction is independently motivated and defined, it is generally accepted that in classical logic a contraction function can be obtained from a revision function by the so-called Harper identity, and the reverse obtained via the Levi identity; 4 see Gärdenfors [1988] for details.
In the AGM approach it is assumed that a knowledge base receives information concerning a static 5 domain. Belief states are modelled by logically closed sets of sentences, called belief sets. A belief set is a set K of sentences which satisfies the constraint if K logically entails β, then β ∈ K.
K can be seen as a partial theory of the world. For belief set K and formula α, K + α is the deductive closure of K ∪ {α}, called the expansion of K by α. K ⊥ is the inconsistent belief set (i.e., K ⊥ is the set of all formulas).
Subsequently, Katsuno and Mendelzon [1992] reformulated the AGM approach so that a knowledge base was represented by a formula in some language L. The following postulates comprise Katsuno and Mendelzon's reformulation of the AGM revision postulates, where * is a function from L × L to L:
Thus, revision is successful (R1), and corresponds to conjunction when the knowledge base and formula for revision are jointly consistent (R2). Revision leads to inconsistency only when the formula for revision is unsatisfiable (R3). Revision is also independent of syntactic representation (R4). Last, (R5) and (R6) express that revision by a conjunction is the same as revision by one conjunct conjoined with the other conjunct, when the result is satisfiable.
A second major branch of belief change research concerns belief bases [Hansson 1999] , wherein an agent's beliefs are represented by an arbitrary set of formulas, and so may not be deductively closed. Consider the two sets of sentences
Clearly the logical content of K 1 and K 2 is the same. In the AGM approach, wherein syntactic details of a knowledge base are suppressed, revising these knowledge bases by the same formula will give the same results. In a belief base approach, where syntactic details do matter, revision by the same formula may yield different results. Hence in the above example, if one were to revise by ¬q, then consistency can be maintained in K 1 by dropping q, whereas it can be maintained in K 2 by dropping either p or p ⊃ q.
Specific Belief Revision
Operators. In classical belief change, the revision of a knowledge base represented by formula ψ by a formula μ, ψ * μ, is a formula φ such that the models of φ are just those models of μ that are "closest" to those of ψ. There are two main specific approaches to distance-based revision. Both are related to the Hamming distance between two interpretations, that is they are based on the set of atoms on which the interpretations disagree. The first, by Satoh [1988] , is based on set containment. The second, due to Dalal [1988] , uses a distance measure based on the number of atoms with differing truth values in two interpretations. A set containmentbased approach seems more appropriate in the context of ASP, since answer sets are defined in terms of subset-minimal interpretations. Hence, we focus on the method of Satoh [1988] , although we also consider Dalal-style revision, since it has some technical interest with respect to ASP revision.
The Satoh revision operator, ψ * s μ, is defined as follows. For formulas α and β, define min (α, β) as
Belief Merging.
Early work on merging operators includes approaches by Baral et al. [1992] and Revesz [1993] . The former authors propose various theory merging operators based on the selection of maximum consistent subsets in the union of the belief bases. The latter proposes an "arbitration" operator (as we shall see) that, intuitively, selects from among the models of the belief sets being merged. Lin and Mendelzon [1999] examine majority merging, in which, if a plurality of knowledge bases hold φ to be true, then φ is true in the merging. Liberatore and Schaerf [1998] address arbitration in general, while Konieczny and Pino Pérez [2002] consider a general approach in which merging takes place with respect to a set of global constraints, or formulas, that must hold in the merging. We examine these latter two approaches in detail below. describe a very general framework in which a family of merging operators is parametrized by a distance between interpretations and aggregating functions. More or less concurrently, Meyer [2001] proposed a general approach to formulating merging functions based on ordinal conditional functions [Spohn 1988 ]. Booth [2002] also considers the problem of an agent merging information from different sources, via what is called social contraction. Last, much work has been carried out in merging possibilistic knowledge bases; we mention here, for instance, the method of Benferhat et al. [2003] .
We next describe the approaches of Liberatore and Schaerf [1998] and by Konieczny and Pino Pérez [2002] , since we use the intuitions underlying these approaches as the basis for our merging technique. First, Liberatore and Schaerf [1998] consider merging two belief bases built on the intuition that models of the merged bases should be taken from those of each belief base closest to the other. This is called an arbitration operator (Konieczny and Pino Pérez [2002] call it a commutative revision operator). They consider a propositional language over a finite set of atoms; consequently their merging operator can be expressed as a binary operator on formulas. The following postulates characterize this operator.
is an arbitration operator if satisfies the following postulates.
The first postulate asserts that merging is commutative, while the next two assert that, for mutually consistent formulas, merging corresponds to their conjunction. (LS5) ensures that the operator is independent of syntax, while (LS6) provides a "factoring" postulate, analogous to a similar factoring result in (AGM-style) belief revision and contraction. Postulate (LS7) can be taken as distinguishing from other such operators; it asserts that the result of merging implies the disjunction of the original formulas. The last postulate informally constrains the result of merging so that each operator "contributes to" (i.e., is consistent with) the final result.
Next, Konieczny and Pino Pérez [2002] consider the problem of merging possibly contradictory belief bases. To this end, they consider finite multisets of the form = {K 1 , . . . , K n }. They assume that the belief sets K i are consistent and finitely representable, and so representable by a formula. K n is the multiset consisting of n copies of K. Following Konieczny and Pino Pérez [2002] , let μ ( ) denote the result of merging the multiset of belief bases given the entailment-based integrity constraint expressed by μ. The intent is that μ ( ) is the belief base closest to the belief multiset . They provide the following set of postulates (multiset union is denoted by ∪).
Definition 2.5. Let be a multiset of sets of formulas, and φ, μ formulas (all possibly subscripted or primed). Then, is an IC merging operator if it satisfies the following postulates.
(IC2) states that, when consistent, the result of merging is simply the conjunction of the belief bases and integrity constraints. Alchourrón et al. [1985] and Gärdenfors [1988] ), but with respect to the integrity constraints.
Belief Change in Logic Programming
Most previous work on belief change for logic programs goes under the title of update [Alferes et al. 2000; Delgrande et al. 2007; Eiter et al. 2002; Leite 2003; Przymusinski and Turner 1997; Sakama and Inoue 2003; Zacarías et al. 2005; Foo 1997, 1998 ]. Strictly speaking, however, such approaches generally do not address "update," at least insofar as the term is understood in the belief revision community. In this community, update refers to a belief change in response to a change in the world being modelled [Katsuno and Mendelzon 1992] ; hence update is concerned with a setting in which the world has evolved to a new state. This notion of change is not taken into account in the previously cited work; instead, it is possible that change is with respect to a static world, in which a logic program is modified to better represent this domain. 6 Following the investigations of the Lisbon group of researchers [Alferes et al. 2000; Leite 2003 ], a typical setting for update approaches is to consider a sequence P 1 , P 2 , . . ., P n of programs where each P i is a logic program (this is done, e.g., in the approaches of Eiter et al. [2002] , Zacarías et al. [2005] , and Delgrande et al. [2007] ). For P i , P j , and i > j, the intuition is that P i has higher priority or precedence. Given such a sequence, a set of answer sets is determined that in some sense respects the ordering. This may be done by translating the sequence into a single logic program that contains an encoding of the priorities, or by treating the sequence as a prioritized logic program, or by some other appropriate method. Most such approaches are founded on the notion of causal rejection. According to this principle, a rule r is rejected if there is another, higherranked rule r which conflicts with r. That is, if both r and r are applicable and have conflicting heads then only r is applied. The net result, one way or another, is that one obtains a set of answer sets from such a program sequence. That is, one does not obtain a single, new program expressed in the language of the original logic programs. Hence, these approaches fall outside the general AGM belief revision paradigm. As well, it should be clear that such approaches are syntactic in nature, and so such approaches fall into the belief base category, rather than the belief set category.
For illustration, we briefly consider one such approach, that of Eiter et al. [2002] . In this approach the semantics of an (n − 1)-fold update P 1 • · · · • P n is given by the semantics of an (ordinary) program P ¡ , containing the following elements:
(1) all integrity constraints in
Here, for each rule r, rej(r) is a new atom not occurring in P 1 , . . . , P n . Intuitively, rej(r) expresses that r is "rejected." Similarly, each l i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a new atom not occurring in P 1 , . . . , P n . Answer sets of P 1 •· · ·•P n are given by the answer sets of P ¡ , intersected with the original language. Consider the following example adapted from Alferes et al. [2000] . We have the update of P 1 by P 2 , where P 1 = { r 1 : sleep ← ∼tv on, r 2 : night ← , r 3 : tv on ←, r 4 : watch tv ← tv on }, P 2 = { r 5 : ¬tv on ← power failure, r 6 : power failure ← }.
The single answer set of P 1 • P 2 is S = {power failure, ¬tv on, sleep, night}.
If new information arrives as program P 3 , given by P 3 = { r 7 : ¬power failure ← }, then P 1 • P 2 • P 3 has the unique answer set T = { ¬power failure, tv on, watch tv, night }.
Again, it can be noted that this approach deals with the rules in a program; hence this approach, as with related approaches, falls into the category of base revision.
However, various principles have nonetheless been proposed for such approaches to logic program update. In particular, Eiter et al. [2002] consider the question of what principles the update of logic programs should satisfy. This is done by reinterpreting different AGM-style postulates for revising or updating classic knowledge bases, as well as introducing new principles. Among the latter, we note the following:
In view of the failure of several of the discussed postulates in the approach of Eiter et al. [2002] (as well as in others), Osorio and Cuevas [2007] noted that for reinterpreting the standard AGM postulates in the context of logic programs, the logic underlying strong equivalence should be adopted. Since Osorio and Cuevas [2007] studied programs with strong negation, 7 this led them to consider the logic N 2 , an extension of HT by allowing strong negation. 8 They rephrased the AGM postulates in terms of the logic N 2 and also introduced a new principle, referred to as weak independence of syntax (WIS), which they proposed that any update operator should satisfy:
Indeed, following this spirit, the preceding absorption and augmentation principles can be accordingly changed by replacing their antecedents by "Q ≡ s R" and "Q |= s R", respectively. Osorio and Cuevas [2007] defined a variation of the semantics by Eiter et al. [2002] and showed that it satisfies all their adapted AGM postulates. Furthermore, they show that a further variant of their semantics is equivalent to the semantics by Eiter et al. [2002] for a certain class of programs which satisfies all except one of the adapted AGM postulates. We note that the WIS principle was also discussed in an update approach based on abductive programs [Zacarías et al. 2005] . In contrast to the works discussed above, Sakama and Inoue [2003] do not deal with sequences of programs but with characterising different kinds of knowledge-base updates in terms of extended abduction [Inoue and Sakama 1995] . In particular, they discuss, besides usual theory update, view update and consistency restoration. For view update and consistency restoration, it is assumed that programs are divided into a variable and an invariable part. In view update, the task is to change the variable part given an update request in the form of a fact, while in consistency restoration, the problem is to modify the variable part of a program P whose constraint-free part violates the constraints of P (and it is assumed that constraints are themselves supposed to be invariant). Let us have a closer look at their method of theory update. Given programs P 1 and P 2 , an update of P 1 by P 2 is a largest program Q such that P 1 ⊆ Q ⊆ P 1 ∪ P 2 and Q has a consistent answer set. This problem is then reduced to the problem of computing a minimal set R of abducible rules such that R ⊆ P 1 \ P 2 and (P 1 ∪ P 2 ) \ R has an answer set. The intended update is realized via a minimal anti-explanation for falsity, which removes abducible rules in order to restore consistency. As demonstrated by Eiter et al. [2002] , this approach violates causal rejection. Furthermore, it is different from our approach to revision. For instance, updating P 1 = {p ←; q ← } by P 2 = {⊥ ← p, q} in Sakama and Inoue's approach results in the removal of one of the two rules in P 1 , while our approach yields a program having {p} and {q} as answer sets.
Turning our attention to the few works on revision of logic programs, early work in this direction includes a series of investigations dealing with restoring consistency for programs possessing no answer sets (cf., e.g., Witteveen et al. [1994] ). Other work uses logic programs under a variant of the stable semantics to specify database revision, that is, the revision of knowledge bases given as sets of atomic facts [Marek and Truszczyński 1998 ]. Finally, an approach following the spirit of AGM revision is discussed by Kudo and Murai [2004] . In their work, they deal with the question of constructing revisions of form P * A, where P is an extended logic program and A is a conjunction of literals. They give a procedural algorithm to construct the revised programs; however no properties are analysed.
In belief change, the operation of belief contraction is a dual to revision. The idea is that in contracting by a formula φ, the agent ceases to believe that φ (if it ever did believe φ), while not necessarily believing ¬φ. Then a revision by ψ can be implemented by first contracting ¬ψ and then adding ψ. There has been, insofar as we are aware, no work on belief contraction with respect to logic programs. There has been some work on the related notion of forget [Eiter and Wang 2008; Zhang and Foo 2006] in which forgetting a literal is akin to shrinking the language by the corresponding atom. It can be noted first of all that the cited works are syntactic, in that they are couched with reference to underlying answer sets. (In fact, Eiter and Wang [2008] discuss the relation between their notion of forgetting and logic program update.) However, more pertinently, forgetting appears to be too drastic to yield an acceptable approach to revision. Consider for example where a knowledge base believes that a penguin flies, F ← P, and one wants to revise by the fact that a penguin does not fly, say ⊥ ← P, F. We can remove the conflict by forgetting P or F (or both). However, if one forgets P, then all information about penguins (say that they eat fish or walk upright) is lost; similarly if one forgets F, then all information about flight (say that bats fly) is lost. So forgetting P or F will allow ⊥ ← P, F to be consistently added, but at much too great a cost.
With respect to merging logic programs, we have already mentioned updating logic programs, which can also be considered as prioritized logic program merging. With respect to merging unprioritized logic programs, Baral et al. [1991] describes an algorithm for combining a set of normal, stratified logic programs in which the union of the programs is also stratified. In their approach the combination is carried out so that a set of global integrity constraints, which is satisfied by individual programs, is also satisfied by the combination. As well, in this approach (as with related approaches to logic program merging), logic program combining is obtained via manipulating and transforming program rules. Hence the result is dependent on program syntax, and so syntax independence as exemplified by (IC3) in Definition 2.5 is not obtained in these approaches. In contrast, in the approaches described in Section 4, syntax independence is obtained. Buccafurri and Gottlob [2002] present an interesting approach whereby rules in a given program encode desires for a corresponding agent. A predicate okay indicates that an atom is acceptable to an agent. Answer sets of these compromise logic programs represent acceptable compromises between agents. While it is shown that the joint fixpoints of such logic programs can be computed as answer sets and complexity results are presented, the approach is not analysed from the standpoint of properties of merging.
In a succession of works, Sakama and Inoue [2006 address what they respectively call coordination, composition, and consensus between logic programs. In short, given programs P 1 and P 2 , a program Q is a generous coordination of P 1 and P 2 if AS(Q) = AS(P 1 ) ∪ AS(P 2 ) while it is a rigorous coordination of P 1 and P 2 if AS(Q) = AS(P 1 ) ∩ AS(P 2 ). On the other hand, the composition of P 1 and P 2 is defined as a program whose answer sets are given by min{S T | S ∈ AS(P 1 ), T ∈ AS(P 2 )}, where S T is S ∪ T if S ∪ T is consistent, otherwise S T is the set of all literals. 9 Finally, Q is a minimal consensus between P 1 and P 2 if its answer sets are given by min{S ∩ T | S ∈ AS(P 1 ), T ∈ AS(P 2 )} and it is a maximal consensus between P 1 and P 2 if its answer sets are given by max{S ∩ T | S ∈ AS(P 1 ), T ∈ AS(P 2 )}. Intuitively, the coordination of two programs results in a program collecting either all answer sets (in case of generous coordination) or picks just the common answer sets (in case of rigorous coordination). While this construction leaves the original answer sets unchanged, the composition of programs combines the answer sets of the given programs. Finally, the consensus of two programs is based on the intersection of the answer sets of P 1 and P 2 and reflects, in a sense, the meaning of the original programs. As the authors of these approaches maintain, coordination, composition, and consensus formalize different types of social behaviors of logical agents and their goals differ from merging and revision.
BELIEF CHANGE IN ASP BASED ON SE MODELS
In AGM belief change, an agent's beliefs can be abstractly characterized in various different ways. In the classical AGM approach an agent's beliefs are given by a belief set, that is, a deductively-closed set of sentences. As well, an agent's beliefs may also be characterized abstractly by a set of interpretations or possible worlds; these would correspond to models of the agent's beliefs. Last, as proposed in the Katsuno-Mendelzon formulation, and given the assumption of a finite language, an agent's beliefs can be specified by a formula, where equivalent formulas express the same knowledge. Given a finite language, it is straightforward to translate between these representations.
In ASP, there are notions analogous to the above for abstractly characterising an agent's beliefs. Thus, given a logic program P, the belief set corresponding to this program could be taken as the maximal program Th(P) that is strongly equivalent to P, that is, Th(P) = {Q | Q ≡ s P}. Thus we would have P ≡ s Q iff Th(P) = Th(Q), and so Th(P) would be an abstract representation of a logic program that may have a specific syntactic representation given by P.
Similarly, the set of SE models of a program may be taken as an abstract characterization of that program. Thus, in a sense, the set of SE models of a program can be considered as the proposition expressed by the program, and so the set of SE models arguably provides an appropriate abstract representation of the logical content of a particular logic program. As we show below, this level of abstraction allows the definition of specific belief change operators, analogous to operators in belief change in propositional logic and possessing good formal properties. Hence at this level, we are able to study belief change, independently of how knowledge is represented in a logic program and instead, again, focus on the logical content of the program.
Logic Program Expansion
Belief expansion is a belief change operator that is much more basic than revision or contraction, and in a certain sense is prior to revision and contraction (since in the AGM approach revision and contraction postulates make reference to expansion). Hence, it is of interest to examine expansion from the point of view of logic programs. As well, it proves to be the case that expansion in logic programs is of interest in its own right.
The next definition corresponds model-theoretically with the usual definition of expansion in AGM belief change.
Definition 3.1. For logic programs P and Q, define the expansion of P and Q, P + Q, to be a logic program R such that SE(R) = SE(P) ∩ SE(Q).
For illustration, consider the following examples: 10 (1) {p ←} + {⊥ ← p} has no SE models.
Belief expansion has desirable properties. The following are straightforward consequences of the definition of expansion with respect to SE models. THEOREM 3.2. Let P and Q be logic programs. Then:
While these results are indeed elementary, following as they do from the monotonicity of the SE interpretations framework, they are still of interest. Notably, much earlier work in updating logic programs had trouble with the last property, expressing a tautology postulate (though this has been addressed in more recent work such as that of Alferes et al. [2005] ). In the current approach, expansion by a tautologous program presents no problem, as it corresponds to an intersection with the set of all SE interpretations. We note also that the other principles mentioned earlier-initialization, idempotency, absorption, and augmentation-are trivially satisfied by expansion.
In classical logic, the expansion of two formulas can be given in terms of the intersection of their models. It should be clear from the preceding that the appropriate notion of the set of "models" of a logic program is given by a set of SE models, and not by a set of answer sets. Hence, there is no natural notion of expansion that is given in terms of answer sets. For instance, in Example (3), we have AS({p ←}) = {{p}} and AS({q ← p}) = {∅} while AS({p ←, q ← p}) = {{p, q}}. Likewise, in Example (4), the intersection of AS({{p ← ∼q}}) = {{p}} and AS({{q ← ∼p}}) = {{q}} is empty, whereas AS({p ← ∼q, q ← ∼p}) = {{p}, {q}}. Last, in Example (5), it can be seen that expanding by a program with no answer sets may nonetheless result in a program that has answer sets.
The overall result is that expansion with respect to logic programs is a meaningful and arguably interesting operator. The expansion of two programs provides a meaningful result whenever the two programs have an SE model in common; if they don't have an SE model in common then expansion results in an unsatisfiable program. Logic program revision, as examined next, generalizes expansion, in that it produces a meaningful result whenever the programs involved are each separately satisfiable.
Logic Program Revision
We next turn to specific operators for belief revision. As discussed earlier, for a revision P * Q, we suggest that the most natural distance-based notion of revision for logic programs uses set containment as the appropriate means of relating SE interpretations. Hence, we begin by considering set-containment based revision. Thus, P * Q will be a logic program whose SE models are a subset of the SE models of Q, comprising just those models of Q that are closest to those of P. Following the development of this operator we also consider cardinality-based revision, as a point of contrast. While these two approaches correspond to the two best-known ways of incorporating distance based revision, they are not exhaustive and any other reasonable notion of distance could also be employed.
Set-Containment Based Revision.
The following definition gives, for sets E 1 and E 2 of interpretations, the subset of E 1 that is closest to E 2 , where the notion of "closest" is given in terms of symmetric difference.
Definition 3.3. Let E 1 , E 2 be two sets of either classical or SE interpretations. Then:
It might seem that we could now define the SE models of P * Q to be given by σ (SE(Q), SE(P)). However, for our revision operator to be meaningful, it must also produce a well-defined set of SE models. 11 Unfortunately, Definition 3.3 does not preserve well-definedness. For an example, consider P = {⊥ ← p} and Q = {p ← ∼p}.
The problem is that for programs P and Q, there may be an
terms of σ (SE(Q), SE(P)), we must elaborate the set σ (SE(Q), SE(P))
in some fashion to obtain a well-defined set of SE models. There are two ways in which this might be done:
(1) Determine a subset of σ (SE(Q), SE(P)) so that only well-defined sets of SE models are obtained, or (2) determine a superset of σ (SE(Q), SE(P)) so that a well-defined set is obtained.
It proves to be the case that the second alternative produces overly weak results. In view of this, we adopt the first approach; however following the development of this approach, we briefly consider the alternative.
Our approach is based on the following idea to obtain a well-defined set of models of P * Q based on the notion of distance given in σ :
(1) Determine the "closest" models of
was found in the first step.
Thus, we give preference to potential answer sets, in the form of models (Y, Y), and then to general models. It can also be observed that this approach parallels that of the definition of an SE model. That is, the SE models of a program P are those SE interpretations (X, Y) where Y is a classical model of P and X is a model of the reduct P Y . Similarly, in determining models of a revision P * Q, we select those SE models of Q in which, for (X, Y), Y is a closest (classical) model to P, and then X is a closest model of the reducts. We have the following definition for revision.
Definition 3.4. For logic programs P and Q, define the revision of P by Q, P * Q, to be a logic program such that:
As is apparent, SE(P * Q) is well-defined, and thus is representable through a canonical logic program. Furthermore, over classical models, the definition of revision reduces to that of containment-based revision in propositional logic [Satoh 1988 ].
As we show below, the result of revising P by Q is identical to that of expanding P by Q whenever P and Q possess common SE models. Hence, all previous examples of nonempty expansions are also valid program revisions. We have the following examples of revision that do not reduce to expansion. 12
(1) {p ← ∼p} * {⊥ ← p} ≡ s {⊥ ← p}. Over the language {p, q}, ⊥ ← p has SE models (∅, ∅), (∅, q), and (q, q).
The first program has a single SE model, (pq, pq), while the second has three, (∅, ∅), (∅, p), and (p, p) . Among the latter, (p, p) has the least pairwise symmetric difference to (pq, pq). The program induced by the singleton set {(p, p)} of SE models is {p ←, ⊥ ← q}.
Thus, if one originally believes that p and q are true, and revises by the fact that one is false, then the result is that precisely one of p, q is true.
(4)
Observe that the classical models in the programs here are exactly the same as above. This example shows that the use of SE models provides finer "granularity" compared to using classical models of programs together with known revision techniques.
Comparing these examples with the update approaches for logic programs as put forth by Alferes et al. [2000] , Eiter et al. [2002] and Sakama and Inoue [2003] , by updating, for instance, {p ←; q ←} by {⊥ ← p, q} (corresponding to Example (3)), in the approaches of Alferes et al. [2000] and Eiter et al. [2002] we get no answer set (simply because there are no conflicting heads), while in the approach by Sakama and Inoue [2003] , one has to remove one of the two facts in {p ←; q ←} (as already pointed out previously).
We next rephrase the Katsuno-Mendelzon postulates for belief revision. Here, * is a function from ordered pairs of logic programs to logic programs.
We obtain that logic program revision as given in Definition 3.4 satisfies the first five of the revision postulates. Unsurprisingly, this is analogous to set-containment based revision in propositional logic. The fact that our revision operator does not satisfy (RA6) can be seen by the following example:
Straightforward computations show that
Last, we have the following result concerning other principles for updating logic programs listed earlier.
THEOREM 3.6. Let P and Q be logic programs. Then, P * Q satisfies initialization, idempotency, and absorption with respect to strong equivalence. If P is satisfiable, then P * Q satisfies tautology.
It can be noted that if program P is unsatisfiable but Q is tautologous, then for P * Q, the principle tautology conflicts with (RA3). For our definition of revision in Definition 3.4, we elected to satisfy (RA3) in this case, in order to adhere with the AGM approach; we could as easily have decided to satisfy tautology and not (RA3).
It can also be noted that augmentation does not hold; nor in fact would one expect it to hold in a distance-based approach. For example, consider the case where P, Q, and R are characterized by models
Thus SE(R) ⊆ SE(Q). We obtain that SE(P * Q) = SE(P + Q) = {(ab, ab)}, and
Definition 3.4 seems to be the most natural approach for constructing a setcontainment based revision operator. However, it is not the only such possibility. We next briefly discuss an alternative definition for revision. The idea here is that for the revision of P by Q, we select the closest models of Q to P, and then add interpretations to make the result well-defined.
Definition 3.7. For logic programs P and Q, define the weak revision of P by Q to be a logic program P * w Q such that:
The drawback to this approach is that it introduces possibly irrelevant interpretations in order to obtain well-definedness. As well, Definition 3.4 appears to be the more natural. Consider the following example, which also serves to distinguish Definition 3.4 from Definition 3.7. Let
Then, we have the following SE models:
and
Consequently, P * Q is given by the program {p, ⊥ ← q, r}. Thus, in this example, P * Q gives the desired result, preserving the falsity of q from P, while incorporating the truth of r and p from Q. This then reflects the assumption of minimal change to the program being revised, in this case P. P * w Q on the other hand represents a very cautious approach to program revision.
Finally, we have that our definition of revision is strictly stronger than the alternative given by * w . THEOREM 3.8. Let P and Q be programs. Then, P * Q |= s P * w Q.
For completeness, we mention the fact that it is easy to enforce well-definedness by simply considering only models of the form (Y, Y) in the revision of P by Q. However, this alternative is problematic for two reasons. First, information is lost in ignoring SE models of form (X, Y) where X ⊂ Y. Second, for our motivating example, we would obtain SE({p ← ∼p} * {⊥ ← p}) = ∅, violating the key postulate (RA3), that the result of revising by a satisfiable program results in a satisfiable revision.
Cardinality-Based Revision.
We next briefly recapitulate the previous development but in terms of cardinality-based revision. Define, for two sets of interpretations, E 1 , E 2 , the subset of E 1 that is closest to E 2 , where the notion of "closest" is now given in terms of cardinality.
Definition 3.9. Let E 1 , E 2 be two sets of either classical or SE interpretations. Then:
As with set containment-based revision, we must ensure that our operator results in a well-defined set of SE models. Again, we first give preference to potential answer sets, in the form of models (Y, Y), and then to general models.
Definition 3.10. For logic programs P and Q, define the (cardinality-based) revision of P by Q, P * c Q, to be a logic program such that:
P * c Q can be seen to be well-defined, and so can be represented through a canonical logic program. As well, over classical, propositional models the definition reduces to cardinality-based revision in propositional logic [Dalal 1988 ]. We observe from the respective definitions that
That the two revision operators differ is easily shown: For example, if
It can be observed that P * c Q yields the same results as P * Q for the five examples given in the previous section. However, cardinality-based revision fully aligns with the AGM postulates. THEOREM 3.11. Let P and Q be logic programs. Then, P * c Q satisfies postulates (RA1)-(RA6).
As well, the following result is straightforward. THEOREM 3.12. Let P and Q be logic programs. Then, P * c Q satisfies initialization, idempotency, and absorption with respect to strong equivalence. If P is satisfiable then P * c Q also satisfies tautology.
Finally, we remark that another plausible definition of an ordering underlying cardinality-based revision would be the following:
However, this ordering yields a partial preorder, and a revision operator based on this notion of distance would be very similar to P * Q; in particular the postulate (RA6) would not be satisfied. Since this operator is of at best marginal interest, we do not explore it further.
3.2.3. Remarks. Both of our proposed approaches to revising logic programs are based on a notion of distance between SE models. In the first, a partial preorder was induced between SE models, while in the second a total preorder resulted. We note that any definition of distance that results in a partial (resp., total) preorder among SE models could have been used, with the same technical results obtaining (but not, of course, the same examples). Hence, these approaches are exemplars of the two most common types of revision, expressed in terms of differences among truth values of atoms in models. As such, our specific approaches can be seen as natural generalizations of the approaches of Satoh [1988] and Dalal [1988] .
We have suggested earlier that the approach based on set containment is the more natural or plausible approach, even though it does not satisfy all of the AGM postulates. This is because the cardinality-based approach may make somewhat arbitrary distinctions in arriving at a total preorder over SE interpretations. Recall the example we used to illustrate the difference between the approaches:
Given that we have no information concerning the ontological import of the atoms involved, it seems somewhat arbitrary to decide (in the case of * c ) that qr should take priority over p. As an alternative argument, consider where for some large n we have
So, in this example it is quite arbitrary to select (as the cardinality-based approach
Finally, some comment should be made as to how one obtains a program after an expansion or revision. That is, expansion and revision are defined in terms of SE models, and then a program is given whose SE models corresponds to the result of the belief change operator. There are two means by which a resulting program may be obtained. First, one may have a good idea as to what the resulting program should look like. For example the third illustrative case in revision was {p ←, q ←} * {← p, q}. Hence one believes that both p and q are true, and then learns that one of them must be false. Consequently, the revised knowledge base consists of the fact that precisely one is true and the other false, {p; q ←, ← p, q}; and this can be verified to be the case by examining the SE models of the change operation. This of course will work only in simple cases. In general, however, one can construct the canonical DLP, as described in Section 2. This is a brute-force approach, and while it does yield a program, it does not yield a perspicuous program in general. Overall then, as with classical belief revision, obtaining a clear and understandable program is a difficult problem.
LOGIC PROGRAM MERGING
We denote (generalized) logic programs by P 1 , P 2 , . . . , reserving P 0 for a program representing global constraints, as described later. For logic programs P 1 and P 2 , we define P 1 P 2 to be a program with SE models equal to SE(P 1 ) ∩ SE(P 2 ) and P 1 P 2 to be a program with SE models equal to SE(P 1 ) ∪ SE(P 2 ). By a belief profile, , we understand a sequence 13 P 1 , . . . , P n of (generalized) logic programs. For = P 1 , . . . , P n we write for P 1 · · · P n . We write 1 • 2 for the (sequence) concatenation of belief profiles 1 and 2 ; and for logic program P 0 and = P 1 , . . . , P n we abuse notation by writing P 0 , for P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P n . A belief profile is satisfiable just if each component logic program is satisfiable. The set of SE models of is given by SE( ) = SE(P 1 ) × · · · × SE(P n ). For S ∈ SE( ) such that S = S 1 , . . . , S n , we use S i to denote the ith component of S. Thus, S i ∈ SE(P i ). Analogously, the set of classical propositional models of is given by Mod( ) = Mod(P 1 ) × · · · × Mod(P n ); also we use X i to denote the ith component of X ∈ Mod( ).
Arbitration Merging
For the first approach to merging, called arbitration, we consider models of and select those models in which, in a global sense, the constituent models vary minimally. The result of arbitration is a logic program made up of SE models from each of these minimally-varying tuples. Note that, in particular, if a set of programs is jointly consistent, then there are models of in which all constituent SE models are the same. That is, the models that vary minimally are those S ∈ SE( ) in which S i = S j for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n; and merging is the same as simply taking the union of the programs.
The first definition provides a notion of distance between models of , while the second then defines merging in terms of this distance.
Definition 4.1. Let = P 1 , . . . , P n be a satisfiable belief profile and let S and T be two SE models of (or two classical models of ).
Then
Clearly, ≤ a is a partial preorder. In what follows, let Min a (N) denote the set of all minimal elements of a set N of tuples relative to ≤ a , that is,
Preparatory for our central definition to arbitration merging, we furthermore define, for a set N of n-tuples, ∪N = {S i | ∃S ∈ N such that S = S 1 , . . . , S n and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. Definition 4.2. Let = P 1 , . . . , P n be a belief profile. Then, the arbitration merging, or simply arbitration, of , is a logic program ∇( ) such that 13 This departs from usual practice, where a belief profile is usually taken to be a multiset. Table I . Examples of Arbitration Merging
providing is satisfiable, otherwise, if P i is unsatisfiable for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, define ∇( ) = ∇( P 1 , . . . , P i−1 , P i+1 , . . . , P n ).
For illustration, consider the belief profile
Since SE(P 1 ) = {(pu, pu), (pu, puv), (puv, puv)} and SE(P 2 ) = {(v, v), (v, uv) , (uv, uv)}, we obtain nine SE models for SE( P 1 , P 2 ). Among them, we find a unique ≤ a -minimal one, yielding Min a (SE( P 1 , P 2 )) = { (puv, puv), (uv, uv) }. Similarly, P 1 , P 2 has a single ≤ a -minimal collection of pairs of classical models, viz. Min a (Mod( P 1 , P 2 )) = { puv, uv }. Accordingly, we get
We thus obtain the program ∇( P 1 , P 2 ) = {p; ∼p ← , u ← , v ←} as the resultant arbitration of P 1 and P 2 . For further illustration, consider the technical examples given in Table I . We note that merging normal programs often leads to disjunctive or generalized programs. Although plausible, this is also unavoidable because merging does not preserve the model intersection property of the reduced program satisfied by normal programs.
We have the following general result. THEOREM 4.3. Let = P 1 , P 2 be a belief profile, and define P 1 P 2 = ∇( ). Then, satisfies the following versions of the postulates of Definition 2.4.
(LS4 ) P 1 P 2 is unsatisfiable iff P 1 is unsatisfiable and P 2 is unsatisfiable.
(LS8 ) If P 1 and P 2 are satisfiable then P 1 (P 1 P 2 ) is satisfiable.
Basic Merging
For the second approach to merging, programs P 1 , . . . , P n are merged with respect to a target logic program P 0 , so that the SE models in the merging are drawn from models of P 0 . This operator is referred to as the (basic) merging of P 1 , . . . , P n with respect to P 0 . The information in P 0 must hold in the merging, and so can be taken as necessarily holding. Konieczny and Pino Pérez [2002] call P 0 a set of integrity constraints, though this usage of the term differs from its usage in logic programs. Note that in the case where SE(P 0 ) is the set of all SE models, the two approaches (of this section and the 
previous section) do not coincide, and that merging is generally a weaker operator than arbitration.
Definition 4.4. Let = P 0 , . . . , P n be a belief profile and let S, T be two SE models of (or two classical models of ).
As in the case of arbitration merging, ≤ b is a partial preorder. Accordingly, let Min b (N) be the set of all minimal elements of a set N of tuples relative to ≤ b . In extending our notation for referring to components of tuples, we furthermore define N 0 = {S 0 | S ∈ N}. We thus can state our definition for basic merging as follows:
Definition 4.5. Let = P 1 , . . . , P n be a belief profile. Then, the basic merging, or simply merging, of , is a logic program ( ) such that
Let us reconsider Programs P 1 and P 2 from (2) in the context of basic merging. To this end, we consider the belief profile ∅, {p ← , u ←}, {← p , v ←} . We are now faced with 27 SE models for SE( ∅, P 1 , P 2 ). Among them, we get the following ≤ b -minimal SE models (uv, uv) , (puv, puv) , (uv, uv) , (uv, puv) , (puv, puv) , (uv, uv) , (puv, puv), (puv, puv), (uv, uv) } along with Min b (Mod( ∅, P 1 , P 2 )) = { uv, puv, uv , puv, puv, uv }. We get:
While arbitration resulted in ∇( P 1 , P 2 ) = {p; ∼p ← , u ← , v ←}, the more conservative approach of basic merging yields ( ∅, P 1 , P 2 ) = {u ← , v ←}. We have just seen that basic merging adds "intermediate" SE models, viz. (uv, puv) , to the ones obtained in arbitration merging. This can also be observed on the examples given in Table I , where every second merging is weakened by the addition of such intermediate SE models. This is made precise in Theorem 4.7 below. We summarize the results in Table II but omit the programs ( ∅, P 1 , P 2 ) because they are obtained from ∇( P 1 , P 2 ) in Table I if ( P 0 , P 1 , P 2 ) P 1 is satisfiable, then ( P 0 , P 1 , P 2 ) P 2 is satisfiable.
We also obtain that arbitration merging is stronger than (basic) merging in the case of tautologous constraints in P 0 .
THEOREM 4.7. Let be a belief profile. Then ∇( ) |= s ( ∅, ).
As well, for belief profile = P 1 , P 2 , we can express our merging operators in terms of the revision operator defined in Section 3.2.
THEOREM 4.8. Let P 1 , P 2 be a belief profile.
(1) ∇( P 1 , P 2 ) = (P 1 * P 2 ) (P 2 * P 1 ).
(2) ( P 1 , P 2 ) = P 2 * P 1 .
Note that in the second part of the preceding result, P 1 is regarded as a set of constraints (usually with name P 0 ) according to our convention for basic merging. We note also that analogous results are obtained in the corresponding merging operators in propositional logic [Konieczny and Pino Pérez 2002; Liberatore and Schaerf 1998 ]. The final example further illustrates the difference between arbitration and basic merging. Take P 1 = {p ← , q ←} and P 2 = {∼p ← , ∼q ←}. Then, we have that SE(∇( P 1 , P 2 )) = {(pq, pq), (∅, ∅)} and SE( ( ∅, P 1 , P 2 )) = SE(∅). That is, in terms of programs, we obtain ∇( P 1 , P 2 ) = {p; ∼p ←, q; ∼q ←, ← p, ∼q, ← ∼p, q} and ( ∅, P 1 , P 2 ) = ∅ . Thus in the arbitration, one essentially obtains that both p and q hold, or neither do. Thus, very informally, in merging P 1 and P 2 one obtains that the information in P 1 holds or that in P 2 does. This is also reflected in Theorem 4.8, where it can be observed that the SE models of the merging are drawn from those of P 1 and P 2 . In basic merging this is not the case, and in merging the various possible combinations of truth values for p and q may hold, hence yielding a program with models given by SE(∅).
COMPUTING BELIEF CHANGE VIA ANSWER SET PROGRAMMING
In this section, we discuss computational aspects of our approach. More specifically, we provide encodings for our belief change operators in terms of fixed nonground ASP programs and give a general complexity analysis of the underlying reasoning tasks. We recall that nonground programs are defined over predicates of arbitrary arity which have either variables (denoted by upper-case letters) or constants (denoted by lowercase letters) as arguments. Such nonground programs can be seen as a compact representation of large programs without variables (and thus as propositional programs), by considering the grounding of a program. 14 The nonground programs we define in this section can be seen as queries which take the (propositional) programs subject to revision or merging as an input database. Thus, we follow here the tradition of metaprogramming (see, e.g., the works of Delgrande et al. [2003] , Eiter et al. [2003] , and Gebser et al. [2008] ).
For encoding the cardinality-based revision operator, we make use well-known minimization statements Simons et al. 2002] , although similar optimization constructs like weak constraints [Leone et al. 2006 ] could be used as well, while for the set-based revision operator and the merging operators we need an inclusion-based account of minimization [Gebser et al. 2011] , requiring the elevated complexity of disjunctive programs. Our goal in the encodings is to provide programs such that their answer sets characterize the SE models of the result of the encoded revision or merging problem. With these SE models at hand, corresponding programs can be obtained via the construction of canonical programs.
Before we start with the ASP encodings, we have to fix how programs subject to revision and merging are represented. For the sake of uniformity, we use belief profiles = P α , . . . , P n , where
-for revision problems, we have α = 1 and n = 2 (and so P 1 , P 2 here represents revision problem P 1 * P 2 ), -for arbitration problems, we have α = 1 and n ≥ 2, and -for basic merging, we use α = 0 and n ≥ 2.
Moreover, we assume in this section that every P i is satisfiable, that is, SE(P i ) = ∅.
Given a belief profile = P α , . . . , P n , we use four ternary predicates, phead, nhead, pbody, and nbody to represent . For each predicate, the first argument i indices the program (i.e., i is a number between α and n), the second argument contains the rule identifier #r of a rule r ∈ P i , and the third argument is an atom, indicating that this atom occurs in the positive or negative head or the positive or negative body of rule r ∈ P i , respectively. For example, let = P 1 , P 2 with P 1 = {← ∼p, ← ∼q} and P 2 = {p; q ←, ← p, q}. We obtain the relational representation of by 15 [ ] = {nbody(1, 1, p), nbody(1, 2, q), phead(2, 1, p), phead(2, 1, q), pbody(2, 2, p), pbody(2, 2, q)}.
Here, we just use numbers as rule identifiers, that is, #(← ∼p) = #(p; q ←) = 1 and #(← ∼q) = #(← p, q) = 2. The only necessary requirement is that different rules are assigned to different identifiers, that is, r = r implies #r = #r . In general, we define the relational representation of a belief profile as follows.
Definition 5.1. Let = P α , . . . , P n be a belief profile. Then, the relational representation of is given by
14 Recall that the grounding of a program P is given by the union of the groundings of its rules, and the grounding of a rule r ∈ P is the set obtained by all possible substitutions of variables in r by constants occurring in P; cf. Dantsin et al. [2001] for a more thorough exposition. 15 Since we have here rules which are all simple facts, we omit the "←"-symbol for rules.
We assume here that all i and #r are given as numbers. Following datalog notation, we write, for a program P and a belief profile ,
We provide our encodings in a modular way. That is, we introduce various sets of rules which implement different aspects required to solve the respective problem. We start with some basic modules, which are used in most of the encodings. Then, we provide our results for revision and conclude with the encodings for merging.
Basic Modules
We start with a simple fragment which contains some domain predicates and fixes some designated identifiers.
Definition 5.2.
Predicates prog rule(·, ·), dom(·), and prog(·) are used to gather information from a conjoined input [ ]; the designated constants c, t, h are used later on to distinguish between different guesses for models. Specifically, c refers to classical models while h and t refer to the first and second part of SE models, respectively. Thus, c and t indicate models of the programs (hence the use of prog model), while h indicates models of a program reduct.
The following code guesses such models for each program P in the belief profile . The guess is accomplished in Rules (3) and (4) below which assign each atom A in the domain to be in(·) or out(·). 16 Definition 5.3.
P models = {in(P, A, M) ← ∼out(P, A, M), prog(P), dom(A), model(M), ( 3 ) out(P, A, M) ← ∼in(P, A, M), prog(P), dom(A), model(M), ( 4 ) ← in(P, A, h), out(P, A, t), ( 5 ) diff (P, Q, A, M) ← in(P, A, M), out(Q, A, M), ( 6 ) diff (P, Q, A, M) ← out(P, A, M), in(Q, A, M), ( 7 ) ok(P, R, M) ← in(P, A, M), phead(P, R, A), model(M), ( 8 ) ok(P, R, M) ← out(P, A, M), pbody(P, R, A), model(M), ( 9 ) ok(P, R, M) ← in(P, A, M), nbody(P, R, A), prog model(M), (10) ok(P, R, M) ← out(P, A, M), nhead(P, R, A), prog model(M), (11) ok(P, R, h) ← in(P, A, t), nbody(P, R, A), (12) ok(P, R, h) ← out(P, A, t), nhead(P, R, A), (13) ← ∼ok(P, R, M), prog rule(P, R), model(M)}.
This allows us to draw a one-to-one correspondence between answer sets of the encoding and models (resp., SE models) of the programs in the belief profile. Note that Rule (5) excludes guesses where the corresponding SE model (X, Y) would not satisfy X ⊆ Y. To make this intuition a bit more precise, let us define the following (projection) operators for a set S of ground atoms and a number i:
The next Rules (6)- (7) indicate whether atom A is assigned differently (via predicate diff (·, ·, ·, ·)) for two programs. This predicate is useful later and we will capture its idea formally below. Rules (8)- (13) tell us which rules (in which programs) are satisfied by the respective guess.
We observe that the answer sets of the program P [ ] where P = P domain ∪ P models are in a one-to-one correspondence with the models and SE models of belief profile . We summarize our observations formally as follows.
LEMMA 5.4. Given = P α , . . . , P n , then
}. We moreover observe the following relations concerning the diff predicate in view of Lemma 5.4.
Finally, we define a module which takes the models and SE models, respectively, of some selected program (this is done via the selector predicate; in the case of revision, it is program P 2 , thus selector(2) is specified for revision problems) and copies them into a designated predicate.
Definition 5.6.
selector(S), in(S, A, t), out(S, A, c), ← nontotal, selector(S), out(S, A, t), in(S, A, c), resultH(A) ← selector(S), in(S, A, h), nontotal, resultH(A) ← selector(S), in(S, A, c), total, resultT(A) ← selector(S), in(S, A, c)}.
The intuition for the module is as follows: we either generate a total SE model (Y, Y) or a nontotal SE model (X, Y) with X ⊂ Y. Thus, the guess between predicates total and nontotal. In case we want to derive a nontotal SE model (X, Y), we have to make sure that Y coincides with the classical model we guessed. 17 This is done by the two constraints. The remaining lines fill the predicates resultH and resultT accordingly, 17 One might ask why we use the different concepts of t-and c-models. where atoms in resultH yield the X of SE model (X, Y) and atoms in resultT yield the Y of the SE model.
The following straightforward observation paves the way for all our subsequent encoding.
LEMMA 5.7. Given = P α , . . . , P n and P[ ], where
For any set S of ground atoms, define
Then, we have SE(P i ) = {ρ(S) | S ∈ AS(P[ ] )}.
Encodings for Revision
The idea of our ASP encodings is based on the observation that all change operations we have considered in this article select distinguished (SE) models. For instance, all SE models of P * Q are among {(X, X) | X ∈ Mod(Q)} ∪ SE(Q). In view of Lemma 5.7, it is then enough to select the appropriate SE models among those in SE(P i ) for a given i. In ASP, the selection of models can be accomplished by optimization statements, expressing objective functions. This proceeding is best illustrated by cardinality-based revision, detailed next.
Cardinality-Based Revision.
For implementing a cardinality-based preference criterion, we make use of optimization statements: A #minimize statement is of the form 18
Besides literals j for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, a #minimize statement includes integers L j providing priority levels. The #minimize statements in a program P distinguish optimal answer sets of P in the following way. For any set X of atoms and integer L, let X L denote the number of literals j such that j @L occurs in some #minimize statement in P and j holds with respect to X. We also call X L the utility of X at priority level L. An answer set X of P is dominated if there is an answer set
and optimal otherwise. Note that greater priority levels are more significant than smaller ones, which allows for representing sequences of several optimization criteria.
The selection of the SE models defined in Definition 3.10 can then be accomplished by means of the optimization statements
where A ranges over the considered set of atoms. Denoting the selection function on answer sets implemented by (15) and (16) as min || , we obtain the following result.
THEOREM 5.8. Let = P 1 , P 2 be a belief profile and P = P domain ∪ P models ∪ P result ∪ {selector(2)}.
Then, we have
18 Minimize statements also contain weights, which are omitted for simplicity.
Set-Based Revision.
For addressing set-based revision, we can proceed analogously to the above, once we replace the cardinality-based account of minimization by an inclusion-based account. To this end, we follow the approach of Gebser et al. [2011] and redefine the utility of minimization statements: For any set X of atoms and integer L, let X L denote the set of literals such that j @L occurs in some #minimize statement in P and j holds with respect to X. An answer set X of P is dominated if there is an answer set
Interpreting the minimization statements in (15) and (16) under this inclusion-based semantics provides us with an implementation of set-based revision. To this end, let min ⊆ denote the selection function on answer sets implemented by (15) and (16) under the inclusion-based semantics.
THEOREM 5.9. Let = P 1 , P 2 a belief profile and P = P domain ∪ P models ∪ P result ∪ {selector(2)}.
Then, we have
SE(P 1 * P 2 ) = {ρ(S) | S ∈ min ⊆ (AS(P[ ] ))}.
Encodings for Merging
Basic Merging.
We continue with the problem of basic merging. Suppose that belief profile = P 0 , . . . , P n is given for some arbitrary n. Also recall that P 0 plays a special role in basic merging. In particular, the SE models of the result of the merging are taken from the SE models of P 0 .
As before, in view of Lemma 5.7, it is sufficient to define the appropriate selection function on answer sets using
where A and P range over the considered sets of atoms and programs, respectively. The qualification P > 0 restricts the instantiation of P.
In analogy to the above, let min basic denote the selection function on answer sets implemented by the last two optimization statements under the inclusion-based semantics. Then, our result is forthcoming as in the previous sections. THEOREM 5.10. Let = P 0 , . . . , P n be a belief profile and
Note that the fact prog(0) is added for the case that no integrity constraints are specified by the input and recall that selector(0) is used to select P 0 as the program which takes care of the result predicates.
Arbitration Merging.
Our final encoding is the one for arbitration merging, which again does not require further modules, except that we need a somewhat more complicated program to prepare the resultH and resultT predicates, since arbitration merging collects SE models from all programs of the belief profile rather than from a single program (which has been the case in the approaches we encoded so far). We thus do not use a selector predicate here but instead provide a new result module below. Also recall that belief profiles for arbitration merging are of the form P 1 , . . . , P n .
Here is the new result module.
Definition 5.11.
in(I, A, t), out(J, A, c), tselect(J), hselect(I), nontotal, ← nontotal, out(I, A, t), in(J, A, c), tselect(J), hselect(I), nontotal, resultH(A) ← in(I, A, h), hselect(I), nontotal}.
Roughly speaking, the first two rules select exactly one program P i from the belief profile. We then guess whether we build a total or a nontotal SE model (as we did in P result ). Then, we copy the model from the guessed program into the there-part of the result, and in case we are constructing a total SE model, also in the here-part. If we construct a nontotal SE model, we guess a second program P j from the belief profile and check whether the there-part of the current SE model of P j coincides with the classical model of P i (this is done by the two constraints). If this check is passed, we copy the here-part of the SE model of P j into the here-part of the resulting SE model.
The minimize statement is as follows:
where A and P, Q range over the considered sets of atoms and programs, respectively; and P = Q restricts the instantiation of P and Q. Defining min arb accordingly under the inclusion-based semantics, provides us with the following result.
THEOREM 5.12. Let = P 1 , . . . , P n be a belief profile and define P = P domain ∪ P models ∪ P result . Then,
Computational Complexity
We next address the computational complexity of our approach to revision and merging. As it turns out, our method of using ASP itself to compute revision and merging is adequate from a complexity point of view.
First, we recapitulate the complexity classes relevant in what follows. As usual, for any complexity class C, by co-C we understand the class of all problems which are complementary to the problems in C. Furthermore, for C as before and complexity class A, the notation C A stands for the relativized version of C, consisting of all problems which can be decided by Turing machines of the same sort and time bound as in C, only that the machines have access to an oracle for problems in A.
Four complexity classes are relevant here, viz. NP, P 2 , P 2 , and P 2 , which are defined thus:
-NP consists of all decision problems which can be solved with a nondeterministic Turing machine working in polynomial time;
-P 2 = co-P 2 ; and -P 2 is the class of all problems solvable on a deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time asking on input x a total of O(log |x|) many oracle calls to NP (thus, P 2 is also denoted by P NP[log n] ).
Observe that NP, P 2 , and P 2 are part of the polynomial hierarchy, which is given by the following sequence of objects: the initial elements are
and, for i > 0,
Here, P is the class of all problems solvable on a deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time. It holds that P 1 = NP, P 2 = NP NP , and P 2 = co-NP NP . A problem is said to be at the k-th level of the polynomial hierarchy iff it is in P k+1 and either P k -hard or P k -hard. We first consider the worst-case complexity of our approach to set-containment based revision. The standard decision problem for revision in classical logic is:
Given formulas P, Q, and R, does P * Q entail R? Eiter and Gottlob [1992] showed that approaches to classical propositional revision are P 2 -complete. The next result shows that this property carries over to our approach for program revision. THEOREM 5.13. Deciding whether P * Q |= s R holds, for given GLPs P, Q, and R, is P 2 -complete. Moreover, hardness holds already for P being a set of facts, Q being positive or normal, and R being a single fact.
Although we do not show it here, we mention that the same result holds for the cautious revision operator * w as well.
For cardinality-based revision, we obtain the following result, again mirroring a similar behavior for the classical case. THEOREM 5.14. Deciding whether P * c Q |= s R holds, for given GLPs P, Q, and R, is in P 2 . Concerning merging, we have the following result.
THEOREM 5.15. Given a belief profile and a program R, deciding ∇( ) |= s R (resp., ( ) |= s R) is P 2 -complete.
Technical Remarks
All encodings presented in the previous subsections are publicly available and can be downloaded via the following URL: http://www.cs.uni-potsdam.de/∼torsten/ ASPChange.tgz. In contrast to the description of the encodings as given above, which follow the definition of our logic-programming language from Section 2, the programs available for download are somewhat simpler as they make use of extended language constructs. In particular, they rely on so-called choice rules [Simons et al. 2002] , avoiding the use of cyclic rules with auxiliary predicates. As an example, consider the first two rules in P result in Definition 5.6. The pair of rules total ← ∼nontotal and nontotal ← ∼total uses the auxiliary atom nontotal to indicate that total may not belong to an answer set. This can be equivalently expressed by using instead the single choice rule {total} ←, making the auxiliary atom nontotal unnecessary. In addition, one must then replace every occurrence of nontotal by ∼total in the rest of the program. The same can be done with rules (3) and (4) of Definition 5.3. In fact, we may analogously treat the disjunctive rules in P result . The reason for taking pairs of rules in the first place is motivated by complexity considerations given that disjunctions give rise to an elevated complexity (which is of no concern in P result in view of the already elevated complexity of arbitration merging). In fact, from an encoding perspective, the elevated complexity of set-based revision and both merging operations is reflected by the usage of inclusion-based preference criteria. To accommodate this, we rely upon the approach of Gebser et al. [2011] that allows for interpreting #minimize statement in various ways. This approach takes advantage of recent advances in ASP grounding technology, admitting an easy use of meta-modeling techniques. The idea is to reinterpret existing optimization statements in order to express complex preferences among answer sets. While, for instance, in the ASP solver smodels [Simons et al. 2002] , the meaning of #minimize is to compute answer sets incurring minimum costs, we may alternatively use it for selecting inclusion-minimal answer sets.
Furthermore, our encodings are given via certain language fragments of nonground ASP such that their respective data complexity matches the complexity of the encoded task. Recall that data complexity addresses problems over programs P ∪ D where a nonground program P is fixed, while the input database D (a set of ground atoms) is the input of the decision problem. As is well known, the data complexity of the problem whether atom a is contained in all answer sets of P ∪ D is P 2 -complete for disjunctive programs [Dantsin et al. 2001] and P 2 -complete for normal programs with optimization constructs [Simons et al. 2002] . Moreover, it is P 2 -complete whenever there is only a single optimization construct used.
DISCUSSION
We have addressed the problem of belief change in logic programming under the answer set semantics. Our overall approach is based on a monotonic characterization of logic programs, given in terms of the set of SE models of a program. Based on the latter, we first defined and examined operators for logic program expansion and revision. Both subset-based revision and cardinality-based revision were considered. As well as giving properties of these operators, we also considered their complexity. This work is novel, in that it addresses belief change in terms familiar to researchers in belief revision: expansion is characterized in terms of intersections of models, and revision is characterized in terms of minimal distance between models.
We also addressed the problem of merging logic programs under the answer set semantics. Again, the approaches are based on a monotonic characterization of logic programs, given in terms of the set of SE models of a sequence of programs. We defined and examined two operators for logic program merging, the first following intuitions from arbitration [Liberatore and Schaerf 1998 ], the second being closer to IC merging [Konieczny and Pino Pérez 2002] . As well as giving properties of these operators, we also considered complexity questions.
Last, we provided encodings for computing the revision and merging operators described previously. These encodings were carried out within the same logic programming framework. This allows for a direct implementation of our approach in terms of available answer set solvers. As well, these encodings also pragmatically demonstrate the fact that our change operators do not increase the complexity of the base formalism.
We note that previous work on logic program belief change was formulated at the level of the individual program, and not in terms of an abstract characterization (via strong equivalence or sets of SE interpretations). The net result is that such previous work is generally difficult to work with: properties are difficult to come by, and often desirable properties are lacking. (On the other hand, perhaps this criticism is not totally warranted, since we have also claimed that such work is best regarded as addressing belief base change; and in classical belief revision, it is typically difficult in general to obtain desirable properties in such approaches.) The main point of departure for the current approach then is to lift the problem of logic program revision or merging from the program (or syntactic) level to an abstract (or semantic) level. Notably, since all our operators are defined via semantic characterizations, the results of revision, expansion, and merging are independent of the particular syntactic expression of a logic program.
A continuation of our method was recently taken up by Slota and Leite [2010] , who, inspired by our preliminary work [Delgrande et al. 2008 [Delgrande et al. , 2009 , discussed answer set program update based on SE models using modified adaptions of the update postulates by Katsuno and Mendelzon [1992] . They define a set-based update operator and show that it satisfies their modified update postulates. However, it is also shown that update operators satisfying certain conditions Slota and Leite consider as reasonable, do not respect support, that is, that atoms true in an answer set may not be the consequence of a rule whose body is true.
Finally, we noted at the outset that strong equivalence coincides with equivalence in the logic of here and there (HT), a logic that can be seen as being intermediate between intuitionistic logic and classical logic. Moreover, equivalence between programs in HT corresponds to equality between sets of SE models. Hence, the results reported here on the revision and merging of logic programs can also be viewed as addressing the same concerns in the logic of HT. Consequently, the present approach may provide an appropriate starting point for developing a more general belief change formalism in intuitionistic and other related nonclassical logics, thus complementing existing research in this direction [Gabbay et al. 2008] . 
Most of the parts follow immediately from the fact that SE(P + Q) = SE(P) ∩ SE(Q).
(1) We show that Definition 3.1 results in a well-defined set of SE models.
For SE(P) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅ we have that ∅ is trivially well-defined (and R can be given by ⊥ ←).
Otherwise, for SE(P) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅, we have the following:
and SE(Q) are well-defined by virtue of P and Q being logic programs. Hence, (Y, Y) ∈ SE(P) ∩ SE(Q). Since this holds for arbitrary (X, Y) ∈ SE(P) ∩ SE(Q), we have that SE(P) ∩ SE(Q) is well-defined. (2) Immediate from the definition of +. 
, and so, since SE(P) is complete by assumption, we have 
There are two cases to consider:
Clearly, in the above, if there is no Y 1 ∈ Mod(Q) such that the above condition holds, then there is no Y 1 ∈ Mod(Q + R) such that the above condition holds. Thus, we have Y ∈ Mod(Q + R) and there is some Y ∈ Mod(P) for which no Mod(P) ) by virtue of (X, Y) ∈ SE(P * Q). In the previous part we established that Y ∈ σ (Mod(Q + R), Mod(P)).
We previously showed that (X, Y) ∈ SE(Q + R). Consequently, from Definition 3.4, we obtain that (X, Y) ∈ σ (SE(Q + R), SE(P)). Hence, (X, Y) ∈ SE(P * (Q + R)). Thus, in either case, we get (X, Y) ∈ SE(P * (Q + R)), which was to be shown.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3.6
For initialization, idempotency, and tautology, in the left-hand side of the given equivalence, revision corresponds with expansion via (RA2), from which the result is immediate.
For absorption, we have Q = R, and so ((P * Q) * R) = ((P * Q) * Q). Since SE(P * Q) ⊆ SE(Q), then from Theorem 3.2, Part 3, we have that (P * Q) + Q ≡ s P * Q. As well, ((P * Q) * Q) = ((P * Q) + Q), from which our result follows. 2
A.4. Proof of Theorem 3.8
We need to show that
Otherwise, there are two cases to consider:
A.5. Proof of Theorem 3.11
Before giving the proof, we first present a lemma that is key for postulates (RA5) and (RA6).
LEMMA A.1. Let E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 be SE interpretations.
To show ⊇ in the equality, let (X, Y) ∈ σ || (E 1 ∩ E 3 , E 2 ) and, toward a contradiction,
We also have by assumption that σ || (E 1 , E 2 )∩E 3 = ∅, and so let (X , Y ) ∈ σ || (E 1 , E 2 )∩ E 3 . Then, from the first part above, we have that
We now move on to the proof of Theorem 3.11.
(RA1): This follows immediately from Definition 3.10. Note that (X, Y) ∈ SE(P * c Q) 
So, assume that SE(P) = ∅. We show that SE(P * c Q)
For X ⊆ Y, we have that Y ∈ σ || (Mod(Q), Mod(P)) and as well Y ∈ Mod(R). We get that Y ∈ σ || (Mod(Q+R), Mod(P)) by the analogous proof in propositional logic for cardinality-based revision.
For X ⊂ Y, we have that (X, Y) ∈ σ || (SE(Q), SE(P)) and as well (X, Y) ∈ SE(R). By Lemma A.1 we get that (X, Y) ∈ σ || (SE(Q + R), SE(P)).
This establishes one direction of the set equality. For ⊇, the argument is essentially the same, though in the reverse direction, and again appealing to Lemma A.1.
A.6. Proof of Theorem 3.12
The proof is the same as for Theorem 3.6.
A.7. Proof of Theorem 4.3
The definitions for arbitration and basic merging (Definitions 4.2 and 4.5) are essentially composed of two parts (as are the definitions for revision): there is a phrase to deal with classical propositional models (or SE models of form (Y, Y)) and then general SE models. For brevity, and because the case for propositional models follows immediately from the case of general SE models, we consider general SE models in the proofs here.
(LS1 )-(LS7 )
. These all follow trivially or straightforwardly from the definition of P 1 P 2 . (LS8 ). Assume that P 1 and P 2 are satisfiable. It follows that SE( P 1 , P 2 ) = ∅ and so Min a (SE( P 1 , P 2 )) = ∅. Let S 1 , S 2 ∈ Min a (SE( P 1 , P 2 )), and so S 1 , S 2 ∈ SE(P 1 P 2 ). Since S 1 ∈ SE(P 1 ) we get that S 1 ∈ SE(P 1 ) ∩ SE(P 1 P 2 ) and so S 1 ∈ SE(P 1 (P 1 P 2 ) ). Thus, P 1 (P 1 P 2 ) is satisfiable.
A.8. Proof of Theorem 4.6
Let be a belief profile, P 0 a program representing global constraints, and as given in Definition 4.5. (IC0 )-(IC3 ), (IC9 ) . These follow trivially or straightforwardly from the definition of ( P 0 , ). (IC4 ). Assume that P 1 |= s P 0 and P 2 |= s P 0 . If SE(P 1 ) ∩ SE(P 2 ) = ∅ then by (IC2 ) we have that ( P 0 , P 1 , P 2 ) = P 0 P 1 P 2 from which our result follows immediately. Consequently, assume that SE(P 1 ) ∩ SE(P 2 ) = ∅. As well, assume the antecedent condition of the postulate that ( P 0 , P 1 , P 2 ) P 1 is satisfiable. Let = P 0 , P 1 , P 2 . Thus, we have for some
. This is sufficient to prove our result, since S ∈ Min b (SE( )) yields that (X , Y ) ∈ ( ) and (X , Y ) ∈ SE(P 2 ). That is to say, ( ) P 2 is satisfiable. Proof of claim: Since S ∈ Min b (SE( )), this means that for every T ∈ SE( ) we have that
We will use this later, and so summarize the result here. (α) (X, Y) and (X , Y ) are such that for every
The second condition is vacuously true. As for the first condition, we have that
If ( P 0 , ) P 1 is unsatisfiable then the result is immediate. So, assume that ( P 0 , ) P 1 is satisfiable, and let (X, Y) ∈ SE( ( P 0 , ) P 1 ). That is, (X, Y) ∈ SE( ( P 0 , )) and (X, Y) ∈ SE(P 1 ). By definition we have that (X, Y) ∈ Min b (SE( P 0 , )) 0 . Clearly, since (X, Y) ∈ SE(P 1 ) we also obtain that (X, Y) ∈ Min b (SE( P 0 ∩ P 1 , )) 0 , from which we get (X, Y) ∈ SE( ( P 0 P 1 , ) ).
A.9. Proof of Theorem 4.7
We first prove a helpful lemma.
PROOF. Let be a belief profile, and let X ∈ Min a (SE( )).
For the proof of the theorem, we have:
; that is, there is some X such that X ∈ X and X ∈ Min a (SE( )). But by Lemma A.2 we then have that
A.10. Proof of Theorem 4.8 PROOF. Let P 1 , P 2 be a belief profile. If P 1 , P 2 is unsatisfiable, then both parts of the theorem follow immediately. Hence, assume in the following that P 1 , P 2 is satisfiable.
(1) By definition, SE(∇( P 1 , P 2 )) = {(X, Y) | Y ∈ ∪Min a (Mod( P 1 , P 2 )), X ⊆ Y, and if X ⊂ Y then (X, Y) ∈ ∪Min a (SE( P 1 , P 2 ))}. 
So,
SE(∇( P 1 , P 2 )) = f (P 1 , P 2 ) ∪ f (P 2 , P 1 ).
Hence, f (P 1 , P 2 ) ∪ f (P 2 , P 1 ) = SE(P 1 * P 2 ) ∪ SE(P 2 * P 1 ), and so ∇( P 1 , P 2 ) = (P 1 * P 2 ) (P 2 * P 1 Observe that Rules (8) and (9) from Definition 5.3 are applied to any forms of models (i.e., h, t, and c) while (10) and (11) are only applied to t and c. Rules (12) and (13) finally take care of the fact that the first argument of an SE model has to be a model of the reduct. Therefore, we check whether the model given by the t-guess already eliminates rules. Note that such rules are satisfied by the h-guess in a trivial way. Rule (14) finally ensures that all rules of all programs are satisfied by our guesses.
A.12. Proof of Lemma 5.5
The proof follows from a direct argument from the construction of P [ ] and is omitted. where σ || (E 1 , E 2 ) = {A ∈ E 1 | ∃B ∈ E 2 such that ∀A ∈ E 1 , ∀B ∈ E 2 , |A B | ≮ |A B|}.
By Lemma 5.4, we know that for each pair M 1 , M 2 it holds that M 1 ∈ Mod(P 1 ) and M 2 ∈ Mod(P 2 ) iff M 1 , M 2 ∈ { π 1 Mod (S), π 2 Mod (S) | S ∈ AS(P[ ] )}; and likewise, for each pair S 1 , S 2 it holds that S 1 ∈ SE(P 1 ) and S 2 ∈ SE(P 2 ) iff S 1 , S 2 ∈ { π 1 SE (S), π 2 SE (S) | S ∈ AS(P[ ] )}.
By Lemma 5.5, we have, for each such pairs characterized by an answer set S, a direct handle to the sets M 1 M 2 and S 1 S 2 , respectively, that is, π 1 Mod (S) π 2 Mod (S) = {a | diff (1, 2, a, c) ∈ S} and π 1 SE (S) π 2 SE (S) = {a | diff (1, 2, a, h) ∈ S}, {b | diff (1, 2, b, t) ∈ S} . LEMMA A.5. For any programs P, Q, and R, P * Q |= s R iff there exist X ⊆ Y ⊆ var(P ∪ Q ∪ R) such that (X, Y) ∈ SE(P * Q) and (X, Y) / ∈ SE(R). 
PROOF. The if-direction is
3). A similar observation holds for (X, Y) ∈ σ (SE(Q), SE(P)).
Thus, an algorithm to decide P * Q |= s R is as follows. We guess interpretations X, Y, W, U, Z ⊆ V and start with checking (X, Y) ∈ SE(Q) and (X, Y) / ∈ SE(R). Then, we check whether SE(P) = ∅ which can be done via a single call to an NP-oracle. If the answer is yes, we already have found an SE interpretation (X, Y) such that (X, Y) ∈ SE(P * Q) and (X, Y) / ∈ SE(R) and thus the complementary problem holds. If the answer is no, we next check whether (U, Z) ∈ SE(P) and W ∈ Mod(P). Then, (i) given Y and W, we check whether for each Y ⊆ V and each W ⊆ V such that Y ∈ Mod(Q) and W ∈ Mod(P), Y W ⊂ Y W holds. It is easy to see that then the same relation holds for arbitrary models Y and W . From that we can conclude that Y ∈ σ (Mod(Q), Mod(P)). Next, (ii) given (X, Y) and (U, Z), we check whether for each X ⊆ Y ⊆ V and each U ⊆ Z ⊆ V such that (X , Y ) ∈ SE(Q) and (U , W ) ∈ SE(P), (X , Y ) (U , W ) ⊂ (X, Y) (U, W). Again, it is easy to see that in this case (X, Y) ∈ σ (SE(Q), SE(P)) follows. But then we obtain (X, Y) ∈ SE(P * Q) by Definition 3.4 which together with (X, Y) / ∈ SE(R) solves the complementary problem in view of Lemma A.5.
We recall that model checking as well as SE model checking are in P. So most of the checks used above are in P (expect the already mentioned call to an NP-oracle) and it remains to settle the complexity of the checks (i) and (ii). As well, they can be done by an NP-oracle. This can be seen by considering the respective complementary problems, where one guesses the sets Y , W (resp., X , Y , U , Z ) and then performs model checking or SE model checking together with some other simple tests which are all in P. Thus, the overall algorithm runs in nondeterministic polynomial time with access to an NP-oracle. This shows the P 2 -membership as desired. As for the hardness-part, we use a reduction from the problem of checking whether a given quantified Boolean formula of form = ∀Y∃Xϕ, where ϕ is a propositional formula in conjunctive normal form over atoms X ∪ Y, evaluates to true, which is z 1 , . . . , z k , z k+1 , . . . , z m . Finally, let w be a further new atom and V = X ∪ Y ∪ {z | z ∈ X ∪ Y} ∪ {w}. We define the following programs: P = {v ← | v ∈ V}, R = {w ←}, and Q = {y ← ∼y ; y ← ∼y; ⊥ ← y, y | y ∈ Y} ∪ {x ← ∼x , w; x ← ∼x, w; w ← x; w ← x ; ⊥ ← x, x | x ∈ X} ∪ {⊥ ←ĉ, w | c a clause in ϕ}.
The SE models over V of these programs are as follows (for a set Z of atoms, Z stands for {z | z ∈ Z}): We show that is true iff P * Q |= s R holds.
Only-if direction. Suppose P * Q |= s R does not hold. By Lemma A.5, there exist S ⊆ T ⊆ var(P ∪ Q ∪ R ) = V such that (S, T) ∈ SE(P * Q ) and (S, T) / ∈ SE(R ). Inspecting the SE models of R , we obtain that w / ∈ S. From (S, T) ∈ SE(P * Q ), (S, T) ∈ SE(Q ), and thus S has to be of the form I ∪ (Y \ I) for some I ⊆ Y. Recall that (V, V) is the only SE model of P over V. Hence, S = T holds, since otherwise
(T, T) (V, V) ⊂ (S, T) (V, V), which is in contradiction to (S, T) ∈ SE(P * Q ).
Now we observe that for each U with S = T ⊂ U ⊆ V, (U, U) / ∈ SE(Q ) has to hold, (otherwise (U, U) (V, V) ⊂ (S, S) (V, V)).
Inspecting the SE models of SE(Q ), this only holds if, for each J ⊆ X, I ∪ J |= ϕ. But then is false.
If direction. Suppose is false. Then, there exists an I ⊆ Y such that for all J ⊆ X, I ∪ J |= ϕ. We know that (S, S) = (I ∪ (Y \ I) , I ∪ (Y \ I) ) ∈ SE(Q ) and (V, V) ∈ SE(P ). Next, to obtain (S, S) ∈ SE(P * Q ), we show S ∈ σ (Mod(Q ), Mod(P )). Suppose this is not the case. Since S ⊂ V and V is the minimal model of P , there has to exist an U with S ⊂ U ⊆ V such that U ∈ Mod(Q ). Recall that S = I∪(Y \I) and, by assumption, for all J ⊆ X, I ∪ J |= ϕ. By inspecting the SE models of Q , it is clear that no such U ∈ Mod(Q ) exists. By essentially the same arguments, (S, S) ∈ σ (SE(Q ), SE(P )) can be shown. Therefore, (S, S) ∈ SE(P * Q ) and since w / ∈ S, P * Q |= s R does not hold.
This shows P 2 -hardness for normal programs Q. The result for positive programs Q is obtained by replacing in Q rules y ← ∼y , y ← ∼y by y; y ←, and likewise rules x ← ∼x , w and x ← ∼x, w by x; x ← w. Due to the presence of the constraints ⊥ ← y, y and ⊥ ← x, x , this modification does not change the SE models of these programs.
A.17. Proof of Theorem 5.14 By Theorem 5.8, the SE models of P * c Q are determined by a disjunction-free logic program making use of minimize statements. To encode the decision problem P * c Q |= s R one just has to slightly extend the encoding in such a way that, given R, the answer sets of the extended encoding characterizes those SE models of P * c Q which are not SEmodels of R. If no such answer set remains, the problem P * c Q |= s R holds. Moreover, by methods described by Simons et al. [2002] , the encoding can be written in such a way that only a single minimize statement is used. Hence, we have a program S containing one minimize statement such that P * c Q |= s R holds iff S has no answer set. Now, since checking whether a program with a single minimize statement has an answer set is in P 2 [Buccafurri et al. 2000] , and since co-P 2 = P 2 , the result follows.
A.18. Proof of Theorem 5.15
By Theorem 4.8, it can be shown that the P 2 -hardness result for the revision problem also applies to the respective problems in terms of merging. On the other hand, P 2 -membership can be obtained by a slight extension of the encodings for merging given in Section 5.3 such that these extensions possess an answer set iff the respective decision problem of checking whether ∇( ) |= s R or ( ) |= s R, for a given profile and program R, does not hold. Since checking whether a program has at least one answer set is P 2 -complete, and our (extended) encodings are polynomial in the size of the encoded problems, the desired membership results follow.
